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1 Introduction
The Weak Weak Axiom (WWA), introduced in the economic literature by
Kihlstrom,Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1976), is a milder version of Samuel-
son’s Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. The WWA is a very useful prop-
erty for the excess demand of competitive general equilibrium models since
it ensures uniqueness of equilibrium in regular economies and nice compara-
tive statics results as those shown, for example, in Nachbar (2002) and Quah
(2003).
The aggregate excess demand does not generally possess any relevant
structure. In large economies, however, if individual behavior is sufficiently
heterogeneous some good properties are likely to emerge.1 Jerison (1999) put
forward a hypothesis concerning the joint distribution of individual charac-
teristics, i.e. endowments and demand behavior, guaranteeing that the excess
demand satisfies the WWA. The hypothesis is called Nondecreasing Disper-
sion of Excess Demand (NDED) and conveys the idea that the patterns of
consumption of the population tend to be more dispersed as wealth increases.
In the present note we propose a new hypothesis ensuring that the excess
demand of a competitive general equilibrium model satisfies the WWA. The
hypothesis is related to the effects on demand of ad hoc income redistribu-
tions and suggests a new way to check whether the WWA is consistent with
empirical evidence.
2 Notation and definitions
Let us consider an exchange economy with n goods and denote by A the
finite set of agents. Each agent a ∈ A is characterized by a vector of initial
endowments ωa ∈ Rn+ and a demand function fa : Rn++×R+ → Rn+. We assume
that fa satisfies the budget identity, i.e. p
Tfa(p,w) = w, is homogeneous of
1See, for instance, the contribution by Hildenbrand (1983, 1994), Jerison (1982), and
Marhuenda (1995) among others.
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degree zero and is differentiable. The individual excess demand is za(p) =
fa(p, p
Tωa)− ωa, so that the function Z : Rn++ → Rn given by
Z(p) = E[za(p)] :=
1
#A
∑
a∈A
za(p)
is the (mean) excess demand function of the exchange economy. The decom-
position of the Jacobian matrix of the excess demand, obtained by using the
Slutsky equation, is
∂Z(p) = S(p) −M(p) (1)
where S(p) is the average of individual Slutsky matrices and M(p) is the
average of individual wealth effect matrices, ma(p)za(p)
T , where ma(p) is the
vector of marginal propensities to consume of agent a, i.e. ∂wfa(p, p
Tωa).
The Weak Weak Axiom (WWA) amounts to pseudomonotonicity of the
excess demand function Z, i.e. for all prices p and q
(q − p)TZ(p) ≤ 0 implies (q − p)TZ(q) ≤ 0.
For regular excess demand, the WWA is characterized by the following first-
order condition.2 For all v ∈ Rn
vTp = vTZ(p) = 0 implies vT∂Z(p)v ≤ 0. (2)
Under mild rationality assumptions S(p) is negative semidefinite, thus by (1)
and (2), the WWA holds if
vTp = vTZ(p) = 0 implies vTM(p)v ≥ 0 (3)
i.e. when the wealth effect matrixM(p) = E[ma(p)za(p)
T ] is positive semidef-
inite on a suitable subspace.
Let us consider the function za(p, λ) = fa(p, p
Tωa + λ) − ωa, i.e. the
excess demand of agent a at price p when nominal income is increased by
the positive amount λ. Moreover, let Z(p, λ) = E[za(p, λ)] and, for any
v ∈ Rn, consider the variance of the projection of za on v, i.e. σ2v(λ) =
2Recall that an excess demand function is regular if at any zeroes its Jacobian matrix
has rank n − 1. See John (2000) and Brighi (2004) for a more general characterization of
pseudomonotonicity and the weak axioms.
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E[vTza(p, λ)−vTZ(p, λ)]2. Jerison (1999) introduced the following hypothesis
on the joint distribution of individual characteristics called Nondecreasing
Dispersion of Excess Demand (NDED).
• For all p ∈ Rn++ and for all v ∈ Rn
vTp = vTZ(p) = 0 implies ∂λσ
2
v(0) ≥ 0. (4)
It can be seen3 that (4) and (3) are equivalent, therefore if S(p) is negative
semidefinite NDED is a sufficient condition for the excess demand to satisfy
the WWA.
Formally, NDED requires a nondecreasing variance of the projections of
za on v. From the economic point of view, this hypothesis is meant to capture
the idea that the consumption patterns of the population tend to be more
dispersed after a generalized increase in income. Let us illustrate NDED by
means of a simple example that will also be used in the subsequent section.
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p
v
ECa
ECb
x1
x2
ωb
ωa
•
•
ϕb(p)
ϕb(p, λ)
ϕa(p)
ϕa(p, λ)
Fig. 1. A two by two example
Example. There are only two goods and two agents. The demand functions
of agents a and b are respectively
fa(p,w) =
(
2w
2p1 + p2
,
w
2p1 + p2
)
and fb(p,w) =
(
w
p1 + 2p2
,
2w
p1 + 2p2
)
3See Lemma 3 in Jerison (1999)
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za(p)
zb(p)
za(p, λ)
zb(p, λ)
Fig. 2. The hypothesis of NDED
and the vectors of initial endowments are ωa = (0, 10) and ωb = (10, 0). If
Z(p) 6= 0, conditions (2) or (3) are trivially satisfied in the two goods case.
Therefore, let us focus on a price vector at which Z vanishes, e.g. p = (1, 1),
and a vector v = (1,−1) so that vTp = 0. This case is depicted in Fig. 1 where
ECa and ECb are the Engel curves of the two agents and the dashed line
represents the budget line of each agent after a generalized increase in income
by the amount λ > 0. ϕi(p) = fi(p, p
Tωi) and ϕi(p, λ) = fi(p, p
Tωi + λ) for
i = a, b are the demanded bundles before and after the increase in income.
Fig. 2 translates the above example in terms of excess demand and shows
that NDED is satisfied. Indeed, the black dots representing the projections
of z on v are further away from the origin than the starting vectors of the
excess demand and this means that the variance σ2v(λ) is increased.
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3 A new hypothesis
As we have seen in Section 2, the hypothesis of NDED refers to the behavior
of individual excess demand in response to a generalized increase in income.
On the other hand, the hypothesis that we are going to introduce will be
concerned with consumers behavior in response to ad hoc income redistribu-
tions.
Given the price p, the vector v = q− p is a ‘redistributive’ price change if
vTZ(p) = 0. The price change v is called redistributive because if any agent
a is given the amount of income
βa = −vTza(p), (5)
then
∑
a βa = −(#A)vTZ(p) = 0, i.e. the βa’s are simply a redistribution of
income among the population. In addition, by imposing the condition vTp =
0 we are taking a specific price normalization for q. Specifically, the price
q is normalized by the vector (1/pT p)p, since vTp = 0 yields qT (1/pT p)p =
1. Let us thus consider only normalized, redistributive price changes and
the associated income redistributions. Formally, given p and v such that
vTZ(p) = 0 and vTp = 0, the associated income redistribution is the set
{βa | βa = −vTza(p), a ∈ A}.
This kind of ad hoc income redistributions approximates the effect of price
changes on the distribution of wealth. More precisely, βa is a compensating
variation of income, i.e. the income that, after the price change, can be taken
away from an agent so that he can buy exactly the old bundle of goods at
the new prices. Indeed, the compensating variation of income ya is defined
by
qTωa − ya = qTfa(p, pTωa).
which yields
ya = q
Tωa − qTfa(p, pTωa) = −qTza(p) =
= −(p + v)Tza(p) = −vTza(p) = βa.
6
In order to introduce the new hypothesis let us consider the Example
in Section 2. As we know, this is a case where NDED holds so that the
wealth effect matrix M(p) is positive semidefinite on the orthogonal space to
Z(p). From Fig. 2 it is easily seen that βa < 0 and βb > 0. Therefore, the
hypothetical income redistribution consists of a tax for agent a and an income
transfer for agent b. Let us suppose that this hypothetical tax/transfer policy
is actually implemented. The budget line of agent b will shift upward and
that of agent a inward as shown in Fig. 3. The new demanded bundles are,
respectively,ϕa(p, βa) = fa(p, p
Tωa+βa) and ϕb(p, βb) = fb(p, p
Tωb+βb). The
mean demand will be Φ(p, βa, βb) = E[ϕi(p, βi)] and the mean endowments
ω = E(ωi), with i = a, b. Fig. 3 shows that the (mean) excess demand,
Z(p, βa, βb) = Φ(p, βa, βb)−ω, and the excess demand of agent b, zb(p, βb) =
ϕb(p, βb) − ωb, point in the same direction so that the sign of vTZ(p, βa, βb)
is the same as the sign of vTzb(p, βb). Loosely speaking, the excess demand
change resulting from the hypothetical income redistribution is driven by the
agent receiving a positive income transfer.
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Fig. 3 The hypothesis of NER.
In order to generalize the above idea, let us consider any redistribution
policy providing the generic agent a with the tax/transfer tβa, where t > 0.
Accordingly, the excess demand of agent a will be
za(p, tβa) = fa(p, p
Tωa + tβa)− ωa.
7
The (mean) excess demand bundle associated with the tax/transfer policy is
given by
Z(p, t) = E[za(p, tβa)].
The group of agents receiving an income transfer will be denoted by A+, i.e.
A+ = {a ∈ A |βa ≥ 0}, and their (mean) excess demand will be
Z+(p, t) = E[za(p, tβa)|A+] := 1
#A+
∑
a∈A+
za(p, tβa).
If we generalize the intuition behind the example we ought to require that
sign [vTZ(p, t)] = sign [vTZ+(p, t)]
for all t > 0 sufficiently small. However, by (5) and the definition of A+, the
sign on the right hand side must be non positive so that we remain with the
following hypothesis:
• Negative effect of redistributions (NER). Let v ∈ Rn be a normalized,
redistributive price change at p, i.e vTp = 0 and vTZ(p) = 0, and
{βa |βa = −vTza(p), a ∈ A} the associated redistribution of income.
Then for all t > 0 sufficiently small
vTZ(p, t) ≤ 0.
The hypothesis of NER has an interpretation in terms of real wealth.
After the redistribution the new excess demand is Z(p, t) and the overall
compensating income variation is vTZ(p, t). If vTZ(p, t) is negative, as the
hypothesis of NER requires, the net effect on total real wealth is positive.
In other words, after any ad hoc income redistribution the population of
consumers will be better off (in the aggregate) at the new prices q rather
than at the old ones p, since qTZ(p, t) ≤ pTZ(p, t).
Let us show that the hypothesis of NER has a desirable implication on
the aggregate wealth effect matrix M(p).
Lemma. If NER is satisfied then, for any p and v such that vTp = 0 and
vTZ(p) = 0, it holds vTM(p)v ≥ 0.
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Proof. Since vTp = 0 and vTZ(p) = 0, by NER, we have
1
t
vT [Z(p, t)− Z(p)] ≤ 0
for all small t > 0. Taking the limit as t goes to zero and using (5) yields
0 ≥ lim
t→0
vT
{
1
t
[Z(p, t)− Z(p)]
}
=
= vT
{
E lim
t→0
1
t
[fa(p, p
Tωa + tβa) − fa(p, pTωa)]
}
=
= vT {E[ma(p)βa]} =
= −vT {E[ma(p)za(p)T ]} v =
= −vTM(p)v.

Assuming that the aggregate substitution matrix in the Slutsky decom-
position is negative semidefinite, the Lemma and (3) yield immediately the
following result.
Proposition. If Z is a regular excess demand and NER holds then Z satisfies
the WWA.
Another consequence of the Lemma is that NER has the same implica-
tion as NDED on the wealth effect matrix M(p). Therefore, not only the
hypothesis of NDED but also NER could be tested, in principle, by means
of panel or cross-section data as indicated in Jerison (1999, 2001).
As a final remark, we notice that the hypothesis of NER suggests a quite
straightforward way to verify whether the WWA is consistent with empir-
ical evidence. Indeed, with cross-section data on households’ demand and
endowments, the suggested procedure consists of the following steps briefly
sketched below.
1. Subdivide the population of households A into K classes of wealth, so
that Ak is the group of households in wealth class k, with k = 1, ...,K
and A = ∪Kk=1Ak. Denote by αk = #Ak/#A the relative frequency of
households in wealth class k.
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2. For each wealth class compute the (mean) excess demand bundle4 Zk =∑
a∈Ak za/#Ak so that the (mean) excess demand of the whole sample
is Z =
∑K
k=1 αkZ
k.
3. Choose a redistributive price change v for the population A, i.e. vTZ =
0 and compute the tax/transfer policy βa = −vTza, for all a ∈ A.
Compute the new distribution of wealth, where individual wealth is
now given by pTωa+βa. The new distribution of households into wealth
classes is denoted by A′k and relative frequencies by α
′
k = #A
′
k/#A.
4. Compute the excess demand of the whole sample by using the new
frequencies α′k, i.e. compute Z
′ =
∑K
k=1 α
′
kZ
k and apply statistical
techniques to check whether vTZ ′ is negative.
Since NER is concerned with the behavior of demand when households’
wealth changes, we had to make supplementary assumptions in order to
use cross-section data to asses the empirical plausibility of our hypothesis.
Specifically, in Step 4, the implicit assumption is that even if the relative
frequency of households in one wealth class has changed, the excess demand
behavior of the households in the class, on average, remains the same. This
assumption is obviously justified if demand behavior and endowments are
independently distributed. Less severe conditions on the joint distribution
of individual characteristics may probably be sufficient.
4Since prices remain fixed, we omit p as an argument of the excess demand functions.
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